Answering questions
of this type inevitably involves a discussion of definitions, in
this case about what populism and fascism actually mean. It is
perfectly reasonable to therefore ask whether the answer matters, if
by making reasonable changes in definition we can get a different
answer. After all we know what Trump is and what he is doing, so why
is an answer to this kind of question interesting? My answer would be
that such a discussion can help sort out ideas and help distinguish
underlying causes from symptoms.
Your answer may
depend on how happy you are with lists. As an economist I’m not so
keen on lists. If a politician or party ticked 6 of the 7 (say)
listed attributes of being a populist, what does that mean? Do some things in the list matter more than others,
and do some items follow pretty automatically from others? My
criticism of one definition of populism I
discuss here is that the elements of the list seem to
be rather disconnected from each other, and appear instead to be
drawn up to encompass a group of politicians/parties rather than
describe them.
For me, the key
characteristic of populists is how they treat those opposed to them. Normal politicians respect the institutions of government, the
law and media, and generally those who occupy them, even when those institutions and individuals work against them.
Populists do not, describing their own views as ‘the will of the
people’ and dismissing opposing views and institutions as the work
of an undefined elite. A pluralist democracy, where power lies not
with one man but with institutions like a parliament and the law, is
anathema to populists. A pluralist democracy is likely to reflect the
variety of views and interests among voters, while populists are
authoritarians that aim for total power.
Context matters
here. It could be the case that, because of the power of money for
example, most or all the parts of a pluralistic democracy have in
reality been captured by an elite. We used to call this elite the
‘Establishment’ after all. Sometimes this elite could work
against the interests of the rest of the country. I wouldn’t call a
politician that simply described this reality as a populist. I would if they
wanted to turn this pluralist democracy into one where only they had
ultimate power.
The authoritarian
nature of populists make it more likely that populists within
existing democracies will appeal to social conservatives rather than
liberals, and in that sense will generally be on the political right.
Appealing to social conservatives means right wing populists will
attempt to create both division (culture wars) and emphasise threats
from minorities or overseas. As these threats are largely imagined,
right wing populists will
tend to lie far more than normal politicians. For
similar reasons, and because they hate the idea that others can have
any authority over themselves, they will also reject knowledge coming
from experts in favour of instincts and ‘common sense’.
Trump’s actions
since regaining power have been typically populist. By
issuing declarations over issues that normally are the prerogative of
Congress to decide, and allowing Musk to effectively close down parts
of government which only Congress has the legal power to do, he is
showing a contempt for pluralist democracy and contempt for the law.
The crunch will come when courts find against him and if he ignores
those courts. Will those required to enforce a court’s judgements
obey the court or Trump? Will enough Republicans in Congress reject
what Trump is doing or will they change the laws to make what Trump
is doing retrospectively legal, or worse still give him absolute power in law? Will the Republican dominated Supreme
Court side with Trump or the rule of law? Will the law operate with
enough speed to mean that any of these questions matter at all?
Equally Boris
Johnson was being a typical populist when he suspended parliament.
The right wing newspapers that were so important in achieving the
small majority for leaving the EU were being populist when they
attacked judges for going ‘against the will of the people’. [1]
Federico
Finchelstein, who has written a great deal about populism and fascism
(most recently here)
suggests four key pillars of fascism: violence for political ends,
lying, xenophobia/racism, and a rejection of democracy. According to
my description above the middle two are shared with all right wing
populists, but violence and a rejection of democracy are not.
Finchelstein defines three waves of populism. The first is the
fascism of the 1930s, the second is the populism of Latin America
(e.g. Peronism) and the third current populism which can amount to
what he calls Wannabe Fascism.
These four pillars are of course a list, albeit short. I have already described why right wing populists encourage xenophobia and are chronic liars. Their authoritarianism puts respecting democracy at risk, but both this and the use of violence are barriers that they may or may not chose to cross. Whether they do will of course depend on the historical context, including how entrenched democracy has previously been [2].
The
second wave of populism in Latin America suggests that populism,
unlike fascism, can live with democracy in the sense that populists
can be ejected from power. That remains true today: Boris Johnson is
no longer UK Prime Minister, and more significantly Poland is no
longer run by populists. However my description of populism suggests
why the relationship between democracy and populism is ambiguous.
Populists are authoritarian, yet they proclaim to represent the will
of the people so should respect the results of general elections.
A
result of this ambiguity is that populists will tend to favour the
appearance of democracy over its reality. An extreme case is where
elections are rigged, but the same result can be achieved by ensuring
the media is controlled by those acting in the populist’s interest
(as in Hungary, for example). Trump is currently threatening
to take away mainstream broadcaster’s operating licenses
because he doesn’t like them reporting reality rather than the
fantasy Trump proclaims.
In
today’s mature democracies populists cannot gain power by using
violence or paramilitary groups, so they will achieve power via the
ballot box. As more recent examples of post-war populist governments
show, once they obtain power they do not need to use the degree of
violence displayed under fascism to maintain it, although they may be
happy to use threats of violence from outside government as useful
intimidation of their opponents (as well as using violence against
minorities). I therefore think Finchelstein is right to see fascism
as a form of populism, but not its only form.
Using
the key tests of violence and respect for election results, is Trump
a fascist or just a populist? Trump did not respect the result of the
2020 election, and did everything in his power to ignore it and stay
in office. That included inciting a mob that included paramilitaries
(“Stand
down and stand by”)
to invade Congress. It was this event in particular that has led
Finchelstein to suggest
that Trump was crossing a line from populism towards fascism. During
his first period of office Trump showed no sign of displaying the
hunger for conquest and expansionist violence characteristic of 1930s fascism, but his recent comments refusing to rule out using the
military in making Greenland part of the US suggests rejecting the
fascist label on those grounds is problematic.
If
Trump is a fascist does that mean Trump is as bad as Hitler? Of
course not. Hitler was unique, as is Trump. There were other fascists
in the 1930s, like Mussolini and Franco, with Franco surviving WWII
and relaxing some of his initially totalitarian policies. In
addition, none of the analysis above suggests fascists need
to be smart,
and they can equally sow the seeds of their own downfall. Indeed, as
Noah
Berlatsky points out,
what makes someone a populist or fascist also makes them prone to
overreach and sometimes self-destruction. Equally it is often their
incompetence
that does so much harm.
Nor are fascists necessarily all powerful at all times, although
because they are populists they will gain power as they dismantle a
pluralist democracy and to the extent that they make it
impossible to be defeated in elections.
I
can understand why some prefer not to call
Trump a fascist for tactical reasons. With so much of the political and media world
reluctant to give up the old ideas of special relationships and a
united West, using such language about the POTUS and his appointees
can make you seem extreme and over the top. But the use of the term
populist instead is also problematic, because not all populists want
to ignore election results and are prepared to use violence to stay
in power. Calling Trump a populist alongside people like Johnson or
Farage grossly underestimates the threat he represents. Right now we
need to be very realistic about the danger Trump’s government poses, and also how we should regard those outside the US who continue to support him. How we describe Trump and his regime may help us do that.
[1] I have described populism in the US and UK as plutocratic, because the populist leaders involved either are very rich or relied on funding from the very rich. This has a big influence on the particular policies they adopt when in power. However, as I have also noted, this is not populism representing domestic capital as a whole. Brexit was certainly not in the interests of capital, and likewise the actions of Trump. Instead they are better seen as regimes that favour some parts of domestic capital over others.
[2] I can understand why this may lead some historians to want to restrict the term fascism to the particular circumstances of the 1930s. It will also become clear why I prefer not to.
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